The administration of elite-making

The Government Information Bureau reported in a press release (July 21) that a ‘Subgroup of the Programme for the Development of Elites from the Commission for the Development of Talents’ met recently (the text is not more precise). In short, it tells us that the government intends to support post-graduate studies in Portugal for Macau students; that a list of eligible Masters programmes is under prep-aration, with the collaboration of a Portuguese university; and that the subgroup had decided ‘to add three grants’ to that pro-gramme. They also discussed the intention of providing fi nancial support for the participation of local students in an international management Masters programme undertaken in Lisbon. The ex-tent of this support is even less obvious than in the previous case; the report formulation somehow suggests it was a very prelimi-nary discussion. The signifi cance of the measures is not immediately discern-ible. The press release does not provide any indication of how many grants were already being considered or anything else of substance. We may be forgiven for feeling that the specifi c con-tent of the decisions reported above seems vague, possibly triv-ial, and their reach hard to grasp. However, these measures are hailed in the press release as part of the Commission’s strong commitment to promoting the ‘development of Sino-Portuguese (bilingual) elites’. This is a subject bound to raise a load of critical, fundamental questions about the functioning of the political system, the aims of public policies and policy-setting procedures. The general, am-bitious aim is to ‘form’ local elites – and bilingual, in addition! Very well! It is a complex matter. Its various dimensions – technical, po-litical, social, ethical, cultural – interact and affect each other. The adequacy of any measures cannot be evaluated without a broader framework. Is there an ongoing refl ection on these and related topics? Have any conclusions, even provisional, been reached, is there a shared understanding of what the specifi c objectives are and how to achieve them? It is not clear that there is one. Addressing all these aspects would bring our discussion very far, well beyond the confi nes of this column. Let us not overdo things. The two fi rst questions we should be asking are very sim-ple ones. First, shouldn’t we expect meetings of high-ranking of-fi cials, most of them at the top of their respective organisations, to focus on matters of more substance? Second, is there any advan-tage in setting parallel (and seemingly complicated) structures, with tasks that appear to overlap those of other public services and bodies? Also: does this subgroup, in the case under consideration, have actual decision and operational powers, or are these just general suggestions that must still be processed through the ‘nor-mal’ political and administrative channels? Let us remember that this is a subgroup, under a programme, under a commission, to advise the Chief Executive. And was any consideration made on how the existing administrative structures can be used, qualifi ed or re-oriented for the purposes of the policy, whatever they are? These are necessary interrogations in the defi nition of any public policy. Setting high-level commissions should serve to help to defi ne the higher-ranking policy objectives and standards, to set the general framework of analysis, and to identify suitable policy tools. Then other administrative units, building on their accumulated knowledge and practical procedures, should take over and incorporate those conclusions and objectives in their routines. Or things risk being quite messier than they need (and usually tend) to be.